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due to improved life expectancy. Our new estimates of regional per capita income 
also permit a clearer comparison with both Europe and Asia. The major advances in 
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in living standards, undermining social consensus on development strategy.    
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1. Introduction
1
 
Although the leading Latin American economies started the twentieth century 
with living standards comparable to those of Southern Europe, and per capita incomes 
grew five-fold over the century, by 2000 the region still ranked as ‗middle-income 
developing‘ by World Bank criteria and enjoyed relatively low ‗human development‘ 
levels according to the UNDP. Despite a large and distinguished literature on Latin 
American economic history, there is little consensus as to why its development 
experience has been so disappointing, particularly in recent decades. Moreover, 
rigorous quantitative research has been hampered by a lack of reliable and comparable 
estimates of living standards for the region over the long run.  
 
The recent literature on long run economic trends in Latin America (e.g. Hofman, 
2000 or Bulmer-Thomas, 1994) focuses on output and trade issues, and has not 
benefited from consistent and comparable national GDP series for the twenty 
economies in the region, let alone other social indicators that might reflect standards 
of living more widely than GDP per capita.  We have recently compiled new series 
from primary sources on a comparable basis for per capita income, life expectancy, 
and literacy which permit more reliable estimation of living standards in six major 
economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, or the ‗LA6‘) 
since 1900 and in the remaining 13 countries (‗LA13‘: Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) since 1950.
2
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2
 This paper focuses mainly on the countries that comprise the LA6 because they account 
for about three quarters of population and output and thus can be taken to represent the region 
as a whole. Cuba is excluded from the LA13 due to lack of comparability but its main 
indicators are shown in the Appendix. The database is available online free of charge at 
http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/. For further details, see the Appendix to this paper. 
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As Table 1 below shows, between 1900 and 2000 real per capita incomes in the LA6 
grew at a compound rate of growth of 1.8 per cent per annum.
3
 Literacy rates and life 
expectancy more than doubled. Similar improvements are also evident in the smaller 
less industrialised Latin American countries, although to a lesser degree. Incomes in 
the ‗LA13‘ grew at only 1.0 per cent per annum between 1950 and 2000, and with 
average literacy rates lagging behind the LA6 by about two decades and life 
expectancy by about a decade – although there were notable exceptions of small 
countries where both these indicators exceeded those of larger ones and approached 
US and European levels.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The paper attempts to measure and to some extent explain these changes in Latin 
American living standards over the twentieth century. In Section 2, growth rates and 
volatility of per capita income are examined and support a classification of Latin 
America‘s long run development into three main periods: 1900-39, 1940-80 and 
1981-2000. This growth periodisation is a familiar one to historians of the region but 
we find that the differences are even more marked in terms of volatility. Section 3 
presents new estimates of per capita income data with life expectancy and literacy as 
wider indicators of living standards. A composite living standards index based on the 
UN Human Development Index suggests that Latin America experienced the greatest 
progress in social as well as economic terms during the middle decades of the century. 
Section 4 shows that despite considerable productivity (and thus income) convergence 
within the region, Latin American incomes not only failed to converge on US levels 
throughout the century, but also lost ground initially gained relative to Europe and 
Asia. None the less, the ‗social gap‘ is shown to have narrowed in terms of literacy 
and life expectancy as the result of urbanisation and public interventions in health and 
education.  Section 5 concludes with a discussion of possible interpretations of these 
long run trends in Latin American living standards.  
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 The LA6 and LA13 sub-regional averages are population-weighted means of country 
values. 
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2. Long run income trends in Latin America 
An assessment of living standards in Latin America over the twentieth century 
depends on reliable estimates of per capita income. Gross domestic product (GDP) at 
constant prices, in national currencies or at the current dollar exchange rate, must be 
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to be comparable between 
countries.
4
 Ideally, these PPP conversion rates would be estimated at (say) decade 
intervals to reflect the changing production structure and openness of the economy. 
However, in the absence of comprehensive price data for the whole century there is 
no feasible way of producing dynamic PPP adjustors; and indeed the major 
international studies do not even provide country-specific adjustors for Latin America 
in recent decades.
5
 We have therefore used the most comprehensive available set of 
the PPP conversion factors based on primary price data for Latin America, which is 
that estimated by the ECLAC on the basis of dedicated country surveys in 1970.
6
   
 
These ECLAC adjustment factors were applied to the GDP series in constant 
local currency units rebased to 1970, which raises the ratio of PPP-adjusted GDP per 
capita to GDP per capita in nominal dollars for individual countries by between 20 
and 40 percent in that year. However, as countries industrialise, integrate more closely 
into world markets and experience greater factor price equalisation, we would expect 
a downward trend in this PPP adjustment. To further complicate matters, 1970 was a 
relatively ‗trade protected‘ year relative to the opening and closing decades of the 
century, when the ‗true‘ adjustment factors may well have been lower. This potential 
measurement bias means that our income levels are probably somewhat overestimated 
for the opening and closing decades of the century.
7
 None the less, our estimates 
appear to be consistent with the leading source for modern PPP estimates: taking the 
ratio of Argentine to US per capita PPP-GDP in 1990 as a benchmark, our estimate 
                                                 
4
 This is because of the impact of trade and exchange rate controls on relative traded prices, 
and of local wage levels on non-traded prices.  
5
 The two most widely used sources of long-term PPP-GDP per capita, Heston and 
Summers (1991) and Maddison (2001), do not report PPP adjustment rates for all Latin 
American countries and in many cases (especially in Maddison) appear to have been imputed 
rather than directly estimated from primary sources. 
6
 See ECLAC (1978), p. 8; and Table A3 below for further details. 
7
 However, even if it were possible to correct for this bias, the correction would only further 
strengthen the finding of this paper that growth was higher in the middle period. See Figure 
10 for the changes in trade openness over the century.   
 5 
(see Table A1) of this ratio is 15 percent, compared to 13 percent by in Heston & 
Summers, which is well within the margin of error.
8
  
 
Figure 1 shows per capita income trends for Latin America over the century. The 
fitted trends confirm that there is a clear ‗periodisation‘ of the century, with higher 
growth rates in the middle decades than at the beginning or the end.
9
 The two main 
points of inflexion (given by a change in sign of the second derivative of the fitted 
trend) in the LA6 series occur in 1939 and 1980: this periodisation coincides with that 
used by authors such Hofman (2000) and Bulmer-Thomas (1994) derived from shifts 
in policy regime; and with that suggested by Fajnzylber and Lederman (1999) on the 
basis of trade openness and total factor productivity growth. Admittedly, the choice of 
1900 and 2000 to frame our period is imposed by data limitations. However, data for 
opening years of the twenty-first century show a continuation of per capita income 
growth and volatility patterns similar to those of the last two decades of the twentieth 
century.
10
 Historians of Latin America would doubtless prefer us to have extended the 
series back towards 1880, when the export-led ‗liberal‘ period began,11 but sufficient 
data is not yet available on a comparable basis to do this.  
  
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Table 2 shows growth rates and instability (expressed as the standard deviation of the 
growth rate during the period and ‗volatility‘ – the coefficient of variation) in LA6 
GDP per capita in 1970 PPP dollars during the three main periods: 1900-39, 1940-80 
and 1981-2000. The first period is characterised by relatively moderate growth rate 
                                                 
8
 However, Maddison gives a somewhat implausible value of 30 percent for this 
ratio; and indeed most of his estimates of Latin American long run real income levels appear 
to be too high.   
9
 The fitted trend for the LA6 1900-2000 is y = -6E-05x
4
 + 0.4788x
3
 - 1397.2x
2
 + 2E+06x - 
9E+08 (R
2 
= 0.990). That for the LA13 1945-2000 is y = -0.0016x
3
 + 9.6152x
2
 - 18768x + 
1E+07 (R
2
 = 0.909). Naturally, the precise dating of these periods differs by individual 
country by a few years, but preliminary econometric estimates of structural breaks in a VAR 
model for each of the LA6 separately reveals a remarkably similar pattern with the breaks for 
individual countries only differing by a few years from those reported here - see (Astorga, 
Bergés, and FitzGerald (2005). 
10
 ECLAC (2003) reports negative per capita GDP growth during 2001-3 (- 1.0%) for the 
regions as a whole, and - 3.0% for the LA6, due to the collapse of both Argentina and 
Venezuela.  
11
 See Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp (2000a). 
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and volatility; the second period by a much higher rate of growth for all the LA6 
(except Venezuela) and lower volatility; and the third period by lower and more 
volatile growth than in either of the previous periods. Figure 10 shows how trade 
openness broadly coincides with this periodisation. The LA13 pattern is broadly 
similar, with high growth and low volatility in the 1945-80 period followed by 
negative growth and high volatility in 1981-2000. Moreover, Latin America is 
recognized as having the worst income distribution of any region in the world, and 
that this deteriorated during the last three decades of the century  (Thorp, 1998; 
Stallings and Peres, 1999). 
 
These trends reflect the dominance of particular growth strategies: reliance on 
primary commodity exports as the main engine of growth in the first four decades; 
trade protection and state-led industrialisation in the middle four decades (including 
debt accumulation); and the recovery from debt crisis followed by of trade and 
financial liberalisation in the closing decades of the century. This characterisation is 
familiar from the literature, and we shall return to its interpretation in Section 5 
However, these results also reveal a feature of the growth process that does not appear 
to have been discussed in the literature: volatility as defined by the coefficient of 
variation in the annual growth rate varied between the three periods quite as much as 
the average growth rate itself. Indeed as well as being an obvious disincentive to 
capital accumulation and potential source of social conflict, this volatility can be 
regarded as a substantial collective welfare loss by conventional criteria of risk 
valuation.
12
  Moreover, with the exception of Costa Rica, the performance of LA13 is 
substantially worse than that for the LA6. This may be due to the inability of smaller 
domestic markets to act as a buffer for exogenous shocks. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix also provides evidence that per capita income in the LA6 
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 Volatility is usually valued as a discount reflecting the premium ( 2
2
1   ) that an 
investor would be willing to pay for a riskless portfolio with the same expected returns. 
Applying the a conventional value for the constant relative risk aversion () of 0.5 would 
imply a ‗collective risk premium‘ for the LA6 during our three periods of 3.1 per cent of GDP 
per capita for 1900-39, 1.0 per cent for 1940-80 and 1.4 per cent for 1981-2000.  
 7 
countries has converged over the century, although the absolute differences in income 
remain substantial. Argentina opened the century as the richest country by far with 
twice the per capita income of Chile, Colombia and Mexico, and nearly five times that 
of Brazil and Venezuela. By the end of the century, however, Mexico and Chile had 
incomes equal to that of Argentina; while Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela had 
narrowed the gap by two-thirds. A similar process is also evident from the declining 
dispersion of income levels within the LA13 group between 1945 and 2000. This 
intra-group convergence contrasts with the inter-group divergence of mean income 
levels between the LA6 and LA13 after 1945 at least, with the ratio between average 
incomes in the two groups rising from 1.4 in 1950 to 2.0 by 2000. This suggests that 
there may be at least two ‗growth clubs‘ in the region that exhibit conditional 
convergence.
13
  
 
 
3. Trends in social conditions and living standards  
While growth in output in Latin America over the twentieth century has been 
extensively discussed in the quantitative economic history literature (although not 
with such consistent data as in the previous section), discussion of social indicators of 
living standards has been based on fragmentary and non-comparable series.
14
  Figures 
2 and 3 show that both literacy and life expectancy exhibit the familiar ‗logistic‘ 
pattern in Latin America over the twentieth century, with the greatest improvement 
between 1940 and 1980. Literacy rates – a key component of human capital in the 
early industrialisation process - in the LA6 rose from 33 percent of the adult 
population in 1900 (probably similar to Southern Europe at the time) to 53 percent in 
1940, 81 percent in 1980 and 89 percent in 2000. The LA13 followed a similar pattern 
but with a considerable delay, rising from 25 per cent literacy in 1900 to 40 percent in 
1940 and 82 per cent by 2000 – in other words, a lag of some two decades on average.  
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
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 As in Baumol (1986) – our econometric analysis of these series is set out in Astorga, 
Bergés, and FitzGerald (2005). 
14
 See Thorp (1988), which contains our first estimates of long run literacy and life 
expectancy for Latin America. 
 8 
 
Life expectancy – perhaps the most fundamental indicator of welfare – increased by 
an average of three years per decade from 1900 to 1940 in the LA6, rising from 29 to 
40 years. Between 1940 and 1960, life expectancy improved by a further 17 years to 
57, and reached a quite creditable 70 by 2000.  The LA13 again lagged behind the 
LA6, with life expectancy rising from 46 years in 1950 to 67 by 2000 (Figure 3). The 
fact that the LA6 and LA13 experienced the most rapid improvements in life 
expectancy in successive decades suggests a common pattern of intervention or of 
social change. The subsequent slowdown in literacy and life expectancy 
improvements partly reflects their natural asymptotes.  
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
These advances in education and health clearly improved the quality of the labour 
force and contributed to productivity growth. The accumulation of physical and 
human capital stock accounts for nearly all the productivity growth experienced in 
twentieth century Latin America (as opposed to total factor productivity growth 
resulting from technological or institutional transformations) and investment rates in 
both these stocks were most rapid during the middle decades of the century.
15
  There 
were two main causes for the higher rate of improvement in both literacy and life 
expectancy during the middle decades of the century: on the one hand, expanded state 
social intervention with targeted public expenditure on health and education; and on 
the other, the process of urbanisation itself with a majority of the population shifting 
to towns with better social infrastructure than the countryside. 
 
In the case of literacy, the improvement evident in the middle decades to a great 
extent reflects not only urbanisation but also large-scale campañas de alfabetisación, 
organised for political (or at least ‗citizenship‘) motives as much as for welfare 
reasons, and the lagged returns on public investment in primary education in the first 
third of the century.
16
  The logistic shape of the curve for literacy over time was 
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 See Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2003).  
16
 For the Mexican urban working classes, secular education was a priority and remained a 
main focus of the Revolution, see Knight (1984). The Socialist party in Argentina also made 
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already typical of the Industrial Revolution (Meyer et al., 1992), but seems in the 
Latin American case to have been more rapid than in US or Europe in the sense that 
the mid-century slope was steeper. This slope is comparable, however, with other 
developing regions in the last quarter-century of ‗global literacy transition‘ (Wils, 
2002), albeit much earlier and without the benefit of foreign assistance.  
 
Increasing life expectancy was probably due to declining infant mortality rather than 
increased adult longevity during the first half of the century, as in 1900 the mortality 
distribution was presumably dominated by infant deaths as in other cases of early 
industrialisation.
17
  By 1960, when we do have comparable data (see Table 3) adult 
mortality dominates, but even so the reduction in infant mortality in the following 
decades is far more rapid than that for adults. By 2000, in fact, the overall mortality 
pattern is strikingly similar to that for the US in 1960 even though 2000 incomes in 
Latin America were only a quarter of those in the US in 1960. As with literacy, we 
cannot simply attribute this social progress simply to economic growth: targeted 
public spending (particularly on urban sanitation) helped eradicate infectious diseases 
and lower infant mortality.
18
 It is likely moreover, that the improvements in literacy 
had a positive effect on life expectancy by improving both maternal skills and the 
ability to access public services.
 19
   
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
The relationship between urbanisation and living standards during early 
industrialisation is not necessarily positive. Urbanisation led to lower life expectancy 
in Europe and Great Britain until at least the mid-nineteenth century, showing an 
improvement only from the 1870s onwards.
20
 The experience in Latin America 
appears to be different, due perhaps to later urbanisation when public sanitation was 
more widespread and disease better understood. In 1900 Uruguay had the highest 
                                                                                                                                            
education central to their platform, with heavy emphasis on literacy and public, secular 
education, see Adelman (1992). 
17
 See Offer (2000).   
18
 In Brazil, for instance, as early as 1902-6 Rodrigues Alves administration prioritised the 
eradication of yellow fever and smallpox, implementing programs of public works, urban 
renewal, and public health and disease control (Meade, 1989). 
19
 As suggested by Riley (2001). 
20
 Szreter and Mooney (1998), see also Riley (2001).  
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level of urbanisation in Latin America and the highest life expectancy (see Table A7): 
at 49 years it was the same as the US at that time even though its income level was 
only one third. Argentina was in a similar situation.
21
  
 
Table 4 summarises the proportion of population considered to be urbanised from 
1900 to 2000 in Latin America: the major change is clearly in the middle decades of 
the century, when the population shifts from being mainly rural to mainly urban. The 
earlier developers in the region (such as Argentina and Chile) make this transition 
rather earlier than the later ones such as Mexico and Brazil (see Table A7). The 
difference between the rates of urban and rural literacy in Table 4 imply that the 
process of migration led to higher educational standards in the middle decades, 
mainly from better access to primary schools. Only later did rural literacy levels begin 
to catch up, often supported by mass literacy campaigns. Data limitations prevent a 
comparison of urban and rural life expectancy over the century but it is highly 
probable that economies of urbanisation had a positive effect on public investment in 
potable water and sanitation, the application of public health measures, and on 
broader access and distribution of medical treatment (including cheaper antibiotics) in 
urban areas.  
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Composite indices of living standards that combine economic and social indicators 
facilitate the international comparison of living standards, but require a number of 
strong assumptions. The best known of these composite indices is the ‗Human 
Development Index‘ (HDI) developed by the United Nations, which incorporates 
three indicators: per capita income (in logarithmic form to reflect declining marginal 
utility of income); a weighted average of educational enrolment and literacy; and life 
expectancy.
22
 The use of the marginal utility notion to scale per capita income and the 
equal weighting for the three components of the index itself are clearly both arbitrary, 
although arguably no more so than not scaling per capita income at all.
23
 Despite 
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 See Laks (1971).   
22
 See UNDP (2002). 
23
 This weighting is defended by the UNDP op. cit. on the grounds that there is no way of 
ascertaining the substitutability of any one variable for any other variable. Evidence on the 
market valuation of longevity (e.g., from insurance data) or education (e.g., returns to 
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these limitations, this approach is increasingly used in the economic history literature 
in order to make meaningful comparisons between living standards in countries over 
the long run that do not rely on GDP per capita alone (Crafts, 1997).  
 
We have for this purpose constructed a ‗Historical Living Standard Index‘ (HLSI) that 
is similar to the HDI in structure with two important differences: first, due to limited 
data availability and coverage on enrolment rates, literacy is the only indicator of 
education; second, for purposes of long run comparison, the indicators are measured 
against a single ‗benchmark‘ rather than relative to other countries in that year. The 
HLSI for country i in any one year t is thus defined as: 
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where Y is per capita income in 1970 international dollars, L is life expectancy at birth 
in years and E is the literacy rate. The HLSI thus compares the actual situation of 
country i in year t to that of an ideal hypothetical country with GDP per capita of 
US$40,000, life expectancy of 85 years, and literacy rate of 100 per cent – for which 
the index value would be unity.
24
  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the overall movement of our HLSI from 1900 to 2000. This shows 
that the standard of living in the LA6 – and thus for the majority of the Latin 
American population – almost doubled between 1900 and 1939 and more than 
doubled to 1980, but had risen again only marginally by the end of the century. The 
increase in living standards for the LA13 stagnated after 1980 as well. As we argue in 
Section 5 below, this pattern goes some way to explaining the degree of popular 
support for the industrialisation strategy in the middle period and the corresponding 
lack of support for the subsequent economic liberalisation.  
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
                                                                                                                                            
schooling) might be used (see for instance Usher 1980), but such evidence is not available 
over time or on a comparable basis for Latin America. 
24
 This benchmark is, of course, that used for the HDI (UNDP 2002).  
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Our Historical Living Standard Index also allows us to shed some light on the 
convergence process within the region. As illustrated in Figure 5, there is strong 
evidence of a catch-up process within the LA6. The richest countries with the highest 
initial standard of living in 1900 were Argentina and Chile, with index values twice 
those of Brazil and Mexico and institutional development to match. However, the gap 
had been almost completely closed by 2000. The period between 1935 and 1980 was 
critical for the catch-up process; after 1980, living standards in the two sets of 
countries decelerated together. Interestingly, the countries with the best social 
indicators at the outset (Argentina and Chile) grew less rapidly in economic terms 
over the century, while those with the worst (Mexico and Brazil) grew most rapidly. 
On the one hand, low initial stocks of human capital clearly did not prevent Brazil and 
Mexico from growing more rapidly and steadily than Argentina and Chile; nor were 
the accumulated stocks after 1980 sufficient to sustain growth. On the other hand, the 
expansion of health and education during the middle decades of the century was due 
more to public service provision and urbanisation than to income growth as such; and 
social indicators continued to rise after 1980 even though per capita incomes 
stagnated. Both these findings imply that the relationship between economic and 
social progress – in either causal direction – may not be so close as often supposed, at 
least in the case of Latin America. We return to this discussion in Section 5. 
 
<Figure 5 about here> 
 
The only comparable exercise to this in the economic history literature is Crafts 
(1997), who argues that GDP per capita is inadequate as a measure of long run living 
standards because imputations for additional elements may be quite sizeable. His 
application of the HDI to developing countries in recent decades in comparison to 
industrial countries in the late 19th century industrial countries reveals surprisingly 
high living standards in the former due to the large increase in life expectancy. As the 
next section shows, life expectancy is also the main source of Latin American 
convergence on the USA during the twentieth century.  Crafts (2002) uses the revised 
income version of HDI as we do, and finds that this further reduces the gaps between 
the leading economies and both Africa and India in 1913 and in 1950; that the HDI 
value for most of today‘s less-developed countries exceeds that of Western Europe in 
1870; that the differences in HDI between Western Europe and each of Africa, China 
 13 
and India were smaller in 1999 than in 1950 due to widespread gains in life 
expectancy; and that increases in HDI are generally greatest in countries that were in 
some way behind the leaders in 1950.  Broadly speaking, our results confirm those of 
Crafts in terms of convergence: with the US this is mainly due to life expectancy; and 
within the region the late starters perform best.  
 
But this is not a rosy picture: in terms of absolute levels (see Tables 5 and A5) we find 
that despite the convergence in literacy and life expectancy, the large income gap 
even between Latin America in 2000 and the USA (and Northern Europe) in 1900 
means that the standard of living in the LA6 in 2000 is now only equivalent to that of 
the US in 1930 and that for the LA13 hardly exceeds the US level in 1900.
25
   
 
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
 
 
4. Comparative living standards in Latin America and the rest of the world over 
the twentieth century 
Throughout the century, Latin Americans regarded the United States as the 
logical basis for judging their own relative living standards. Further afield, Southern 
Europe had been the traditional basis for comparison, but in the last quarter of the 
century Asia became the benchmark as European social standards seemed 
unattainable and Asia began to catch up economically.  Table 6 shows the ratio of 
Latin American per capita income, literacy, and life expectancy to US levels. Broadly 
speaking, life expectancy and literacy converged on US levels by the end of the 
century, but incomes failed to follow suit.  
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
The ratio of per capita incomes in Latin America and the US is illustrated in Figure 5 
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 The pre-1950 group means for LA13 are not very reliable, due to the fragmentary nature 
of the data for these countries, which is why they are not shown in Figures 1- 8.  
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in greater detail. The asymmetric economic cycles in the northern and southern 
Americas account for the considerable fluctuations in this ratio over time, but 
although a divergent trend is clear for the LA13, there appears to be no long-term 
trend for the LA6.
26
 The greatest narrowing of the income gap for the LA6 occurred 
in the 1930s, which is explained by the fact that Latin American output fell by much 
less than that of the US during the Great Depression, and recovered more rapidly – 
largely due to effective protection provided by exchange shortages and trade policy.
27
  
However, this gain was short-lived and lost again during the WWII boom in the US.  
Although as Figure 6b indicates, LA6 growth was similar to and steadier than in the 
US until the early 1980s, a marked divergence is evident thereafter – the result of the 
product of the long US boom on the one hand and a series of Latin American 
macroeconomic crises combined with the failure to develop a dynamic manufactured 
export base in all countries except Mexico. After some gains relative to US income 
levels in the late 1940s, the LA13 steadily declined relative to the US, especially after 
the 1980s for much the same reasons as the LA6. 
 
<Figure 6a and Figure 6b about here> 
 
The convergence in literacy rates shown in Tables 4 and A4 is notable but quite 
steady and not entirely unexpected because of the existence of a natural limit: 
international comparisons of the extent and quality of education with other developing 
regions shows a less positive picture.
28
 Convergence of LA6 life expectancy at birth 
with US standards, in contrast, is remarkable (Figure 7) - particularly since it mainly 
occurred during the four decades 1940-80 and as we have seen, reflected increased 
adult life expectancy as much as declining infant mortality. The LA13 followed 
closely behind. In this respect, Latin American nations could be considered to have 
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 Standard cointegration tests indicate that over the century as a whole the ratio of LA6 per 
capita income to the US is in fact stationary, see Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2005). 
27
 The internal demand stimulus created by effective protection was strengthened by fiscal 
expansion and infrastructure provision: see Cárdenas, Ocampo & Thorp (2000b). This in turn 
led to rising rates of domestic investment (Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald, 2004) 
28
 Although the region had reached 95 percent primary and 65 percent secondary enrolment 
rates by 2000 (World Bank, 2004) , Chile - the only Latin American country to participate in 
the 1999 Third International Mathematics and Science Study - came 35
th
 out of 38 entrants, 
well behind Malaysia and Thailand, see PREAL (2001), p. 6. 
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been rather more effective in extending their citizens‘ lives than in raising their 
incomes.
29
  
 
<Figure 7 about here> 
 
The convergence of life expectancy, particularly when combined with the assumption 
of a declining marginal utility of income in our HLSI measure, suggests that there has 
indeed been limited convergence of living standards in the LA6 and the LA13 relative 
to the USA (Figure 8), despite the large gap in relative income.
30
 Moreover, despite 
growing divergence in per capita incomes, some of the smaller countries in the LA13 
were also able to make impressive gains on living standards relative to the US. 
Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Cuba are three notable examples. Even as early as 1900, 
life expectancy at birth in Uruguay was slightly higher than that of the US (Table 6) 
and still only slightly below in 2000. Costa Rica and Cuba were both able to 
approximate US life expectancy and literacy standards by the end of the century too. 
Insofar as standards of medical care and schooling are logically higher in the US for 
the upper economic quintile(s) than in Latin America, this might be taken to imply 
that in these three countries at least, primary health and education provision for the 
lower strata of the population may even be better than in the US.   
 
<Figure 8 about here> 
 
As we have seen, the LA6 maintained a fairly steady ratio of incomes to the US level 
over the century and as Figure 9 below shows, there been no sustained economic 
convergence with the Northern European countries (England, France, and Germany), 
but Latin America has also fallen behind the Southern Europe and Asia in the second 
half of the century. Between 1900 and 1930, average LA6 incomes ranged from a 
quarter to a third of those in Southern Europe. With the depression and war in Europe, 
as well as Latin America‘s stronger growth performance, the gap narrowed 
                                                 
29
 Increased longevity should presumably be adjusted for health quality in old age: however, 
despite the evident superiority of US geriatric medicine, family support in Latin America may 
well provide a comparable quality of care in old age.  
30
 The gap also extends to the proportion of GDP spent on public health and education, 
which were both about double in the US compared to the LA6 in the 1990s. Expressed in 
PPP-dollars, the absolute level of per capita expenditures on public health and education in 
the LA6 each about 5 percent respectively of the US levels - data from UNDP (2002). 
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considerably such that by 1945 it had reached about half of Southern European levels. 
By 1960, however, the original gap had been restored: high returns on human capital 
investment coupled with the process of economic integration prompted an 
acceleration of Southern Europe‘s growth rate, while the emergence of the welfare 
state raised longevity. Subsequently the gap steadily widened.  
 
<Figure 9 about here> 
 
The Argentine case offers a telling illustration. In 1900, Argentina was relatively 
well-positioned vis-à-vis the Southern European countries, with a comparable per 
capita income of $487 versus $632 (at 1970 PPP prices). In consequence, it could 
attract major immigration flow of skilled labour from Spain and Italy seeking 
opportunities for upward social mobility. Despite the fall in world demand for its 
main exports and exclusion from British Dominion trade in the twenties and thirties, 
Argentine income levels during the forties climbed to an average of 86 per cent of 
those in Southern Europe. Subsequently, political and economic instability and 
persistent distributional conflict saw a steady decline in Argentine income levels to 
just 24 per cent of those in Southern Europe by 2000.
31
 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, LA6 per capita PPP-GDP was only slightly above Asian (India, 
Indonesia, and Korea in our index
32
) between 1900 and 1939; but this advantage rose 
sharply in the 1940s due to sustained growth in Latin America and the effect of the 
World War on in Asia. This advantage was maintained and increased up to 1980, 
when Latin American incomes were double those in Asia. Only subsequently did the 
combination of the Asian ‗miracle‘ and low growth in Latin America dramatically 
eliminate this advantage, so that by the end of the century the two regions again had 
similar income levels. The roots of this experience lie in part in the differential impact 
of global conflicts, but also to the different way in which the two regions moved on 
from the shared initial experience of ‗extensive‘ industrialisation based on import 
protection and state intervention.    
                                                 
31
 According to Portantiero (1989) this cannot simply be attributed to ‗policy failure‘ or 
even to the lack of appropriate economic institutions, but rather to the prolonged stalemate 
between conflicting social groups which in turn prevented political modernisation. 
32
 These countries are chosen because their data coverage permits analysis for the whole 
period from 1900 to 2000: see Appendix for sources. 
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5. Interpreting the Latin American Standard of Living in the Long Run 
This paper has made use of a new long run inter-country comparable data set 
for Latin America to examine the evolution of living standards in the region from 
1900 to 2000. Our main findings are as follows: 
a) Not only were Latin American per capita income growth rates between the 
nineteen-forties and nineteen-seventies both significantly higher and less 
volatile than in the preceding and succeeding decades, but social progress 
(measured by literacy and life expectancy) was also more rapid;  
b) Improvements in Latin American living standards, both in absolute terms 
and in relation to industrialised countries, were due as much to 
improvements in life expectancy and literacy – two ‗transitions‘ resulting 
from rapid urbanisation and increased public expenditure – as to economic 
growth; 
c) There was considerable economic and social convergence between the 
largest six economies of the region over the century, reflecting similar 
patterns of industrialisation, urbanisation and public provision; but the 
smaller countries did not participate in this convergence process;  
d) There was no economic convergence with the USA over the century as a 
whole; and by 2000 living standards in the larger economies only 
approximated those of the US in the 1930s; while those in the smaller ones 
did not exceed the US level in 1900; 
e) Not only did the income gap with Southern Europe (which had been 
closing in the first half of the century) widen in the second half, but the 
leading Asian economies also caught up once again with Latin America;  
f) Progress in health and education appears to have been largely independent 
of economic growth as such, depending rather on public intervention and 
urbanisation and thus on fiscal and industrial structures.  
 
Some of these results confirm those already familiar from the economic history 
literature, but this is the first time that comparable data over time and space has been 
used to demonstrate them systematically. The quantitative difference between the 
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economic and social results for 1939-1980 and the rest of the century is larger than in 
previous studies, and underlines the need for a renewed debate among economic 
historians on the strengths and weaknesses of the process of state-led industrialisation 
now that the initial over-enthusiasm for the structural reforms of recent decades – 
themselves largely a reaction to the previous development strategy - has largely 
abated (Cárdenas, Ocampo, and Thorp, 2000b).
33
  
 
It is now clear that the four decades in the middle of the century stand out for the 
outstanding progress made by nearly every country in the region. This was the period 
of increasing manufacturing share in output and rising labour productivity in both 
industry and agriculture
34
, as well as a shift in labour force allocation from primary to 
secondary sectors that accompanied the urbanisation process.
35
 It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that greater reliance on the domestic market was a major source of 
growth during the so-called ‗import substitution‘ phase of state-led industrialisation. 
Urbanisation, associated with industrial employment, and public expenditure on 
health and education were key drivers of improved standards of living as we have 
shown in this paper. This period also saw the greatest structural change in the Latin 
American economy, and was marked by sustained and relatively stable growth and 
social improvement. Our preliminary estimates show that the region experienced 
higher total factor productivity growth and higher investment in fixed capital per 
worker in these mid-century decades (Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald, 2004).
36
 In 
contrast, the periods from 1900 to 1940 and from 1980 to 2000 saw lower economic 
growth and far more instability; derived from less investment and productivity 
change.   
 
It cannot said that ‗institutions‘ were in some sense ‗better‘ in general during the 
                                                 
33
 The recovery of most Latin American economies in the early 1990s was adduced as 
evidence by many ‗orthodox‘ authors (such as Edwards (1995) or Easterly, Loayza, and 
Montiel (1997)) that the liberalisation process was bearing fruit; but subsequent events did not 
justify this optimism. Meanwhile, more ‗heterodox‘ observers showed that while the 
economic gains were modest at best, the concurrent increase in inequality across region had 
led to rising poverty levels (Stallings and Peres (2000), Taylor (1999), and Ffrench-Davis 
(2000).   
34
 Due to the reduction of surplus labour in agriculture as well as technological change. 
35
 The data on this process is analysed in depth in Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2004).  
36
 Indeed, our estimates (op. cit) indicate that the level of fixed capital per worker hardly 
rose at all between 1980 and 2000, while the productivity of manufacturing labour actually 
declined.  
 19 
middle of the century than before or after; nor that the highest performing countries 
(Brazil and Mexico) had better institutions – particularly at the outset – than those that 
performed less well such as Argentina and Chile. However, Figure 10 does imply that 
poor economic growth and greater volatility in the first and third periods could be 
related to the degree of exposure to world markets, as measured by the trade-to-GDP 
ratio. The main channel for transmitting volatility is commodity prices
37
, while trade 
openness may also proxy for exposure to international financial markets – which tend 
to have a pro-cyclical effect.  By extension, the considerable growth differences 
between larger and smaller countries in Latin America may well be due to smaller 
export to GDP and debt to GDP ratios in the former which heighten the vulnerability 
of smaller countries to trade and interest rate shocks. (Astorga, Bergés and Fitzgerald, 
2005). 
 
<Figure 10 about here> 
  
This view is open to two criticisms. The first is that most of the world economy 
experienced rapid rates of growth in the post-WWII decades, and the US itself during 
the War years, so that the Latin American experience was not unique or necessarily 
attributable to its industrialisation strategy. However, the upturn in the Latin 
American economy preceded that of the US in the 1930s while Southern Europe only 
accelerated in the 1970s when Latin America was decelerating. Moreover, when 
compared to Asia it is in the post-1980 period when Latin America falls seriously 
behind in the industrialisation race – opening its markets to manufactured imports 
rather than promoting manufactured exports. In other words, the economic growth 
cycle in Latin America cannot simply be attributed to global trends.  
 
The second criticism is that while the middle period did see reasonable growth and 
social progress, it was achieved at the cost of debt accumulation, which then explains 
                                                 
37
 Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2005) apply error-correction models to the LA6 over the 
century: capital and (literacy adjusted) labour explain the underlying trends, and exogenous 
(and endogenous) shocks explain deviations from those trends. External demand factors (both 
world trade and the coefficient of variation in the terms of trade) appear to be particularly 
significant in the first and third periods, and domestic factors – particularly capital stocks – in 
the second.  
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low growth during the subsequent liberalisation period.
38
 However, the debt crisis was 
fiscal in nature, and generated by an inability to raise tax revenue to modern levels 
rather than excess social expenditure or public investment, which implies that it was 
not caused by the industrialisation model as such.
39
 Indeed, the danger of creating 
inefficient industries behind tariff walls and unsustainable budget deficits were both 
well recognized by Latin American governments from at least the 1960s onwards and 
repeated efforts were made to both increase manufactured exports and raise tax 
revenues (FitzGerald, 2000). In 2000, after two decades of market reforms, fiscal 
retrenchment and trade liberalisation the Latin American debt burden had not been 
significantly reduced and tax pressure (particularly direct taxes) remained well below 
comparable OECD and developing countries.
40
 In contrast, in East Asia industrial 
protection did not lead to excessive indebtedness because of conservative fiscal 
policies; while when a debt crisis did occur after premature financial liberalisation in 
the 1990s, the trade deficit was quickly reversed and the debt paid off in a few years.    
 
The issue can perhaps be better understood in terms of the changes in economic 
doctrine prevalent in Latin America. FitzGerald and Thorp (2005) show how 
frustration with the development experience before 1930 – based on open primary 
export economies - precipitated state intervention in domestic markets and protected 
industrialisation.  Excess capacity inherited from previous industrial investment, trade 
protection provided by the collapse of world markets and unplanned fiscal deficits all 
supported this shift. After 1980 the experience of debt crisis and industrial 
inefficiency in their turn spurred a shift in focus towards trade liberalisation and 
foreign investment as engines of growth; at this stage, global investor interest in 
privatisations and pressure from Washington certainly helped push the reforms 
forward. However, the same study also stresses that these changes in economic 
ideology were driven by domestic and international political concerns in the deepest 
sense: the move away from economic liberalism towards public intervention and 
planned industrialisation responded to pressures from emerging urban classes and 
worldwide nationalist aspirations; while the move back to economic liberalism in the 
                                                 
38
 This was a dominant theme among economists associated with the so-called ‗Washington 
Consensus‘: see for instance Dornbusch and Edwards (1991)  
39
 See FitzGerald (1985) on Mexico and Kosacoff (2000) on Argentina.  
40
 See Shome (1999). 
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1980s formed an essential part of the transition to democracy throughout the 
continent, and also matched a similar trend worldwide.  
 
These major strategy shifts were clearly associated changing living standards for the 
majority of the population during the twentieth century. The state-led industrialisation 
drive in the middle of the century was associated with rapidly rising living standards 
for a large part of the Latin American population, while the liberalisation strategy of 
the closing period has not had that effect – indeed living standards have risen less than 
in the equivalent primary-export led opening decades of the century. It is not difficult 
to understand therefore why there was widespread political support for the former 
model and continued political doubts about the latter. But there is little serious 
popular or intellectual support in the region today for return to the previous economic 
model, and it is not possible to repeat the early gains from import-substitution, 
urbanisation and public sanitation in any case. However, to significantly raise living 
standards in the region will require not only several decades of sustained economic 
growth but also radical fiscal reform in order to finance the acquisition of labour skills 
and inclusive social services if inequality is not to increase further.   
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Statistical Appendix 
International organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
United Nations, the World Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, provide comparative data for Latin America from approximately 
1960 onwards. Data previous to 1960 can be found in compendia of historical 
statistics on the region such as Mitchell International Historical Statistics: The 
Americas, 1750-1993 or Wilkie Statistical Abstract of Latin America but these do not 
ensure compatibility of data for different countries nor complete coverage of the 
period. There are of course many excellent country studies, the most important of 
which are cited below, but as well as using different methodologies and definitions, 
most do not attempt complete coverage of the century. Bulmer-Thomas (1994), 
Maddison (1995), Hofman (2000), Mitchell (1998), and Wilkie (2002) all report long-
run GDP series for the largest economies in the region (as well as other economic 
indicators) but these are not strictly comparable between countries and do not include 
social indicators. 
 
The Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OxLAD) originates from 
the work carried out for the statistical appendix to Thorp (1998); since considerably 
extended and systematised. Its purpose is to provide economic and social historians 
worldwide—and particularly in Latin America—with a systematic recompilation of 
available statistical information for the countries in the region for the period 1900 to 
2000 in a single on-line source. The data presented have been selected with a view to 
providing comprehensive coverage while ensuring as much consistency and 
intercountry and over-time comparability as possible in the definition, coverage, and 
valuation of the series. Specifically, OxLAD provides extended comparable GDP and 
sectoral value-added series in constant purchasing power parity prices originally 
reported by ECLAC (1978) to 2000, and retroactively toward 1900s where possible.  
 
Our GDP per capita estimates are summarised in Table A.1 below. The main 
difference between the GDP estimates in constant price valuation in international 
dollars reported in OxLAD and those in  Hofman (2000) and Maddison (1995, 2001) 
lies in the estimates of purchasing power parities. Maddison (2001) relies on Geary-
Khamis purchasing power parities (PPPs) from phase IV of the International 
Comparisons Project (ICP IV), with 1980 benchmarks for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, and Venezuela, and on Geary-Khamis PPPs from ICP III for 1975 
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benchmarks for Mexico.
41
 The Hofman (2000) estimates were provided directly by 
Alan Heston (AH), with 1980 benchmarks for the LA6. OxLAD estimates rely on 
1970 benchmarks for the LA6 from the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (1978). These purchasing power parities (PPPs) are reported in Table 
A2. Comparison of PPPs and exchange rates shows that exchange rates are much 
higher than PPPs for all countries in the case of ECLAC (1970), and for all countries 
except Argentina in the case of the ICP IV and AH. The deviation between PPPs and 
exchange rates in Table A3 suggests that comparisons based on current exchange 
rates tend to understate GDP.  
 
We have used the ECLAC series rather than the ICP IV and AH series mainly 
because the commodity bundle chosen for price comparisons is specific to Latin 
America, whereas that chosen in the ICP IV and AH is more general to encompass 
price comparisons and average international prices applicable to industrialised, semi-
industrialised, and least developed countries alike from across the globe. Although 
the ICP programme is carried out separately for six different regions, these regions 
are linked by binary comparisons with selected countries in each region to a partner 
in another region.
42
 In contrast, the PPPs reported by ECLAC were based on a 
representative basket for each Latin American country.
43
  
  
OxLAD also contains new and more reliable data for literacy produced by Shane and 
Barbara Hunt for the Thorp volume, which we have since updated and report in Table 
A4 below.
44
 Literacy is defined in the conventional way, as the percentage of the 
population of or above a certain age (usually 15) who cannot read and write a simple 
statement about everyday life, and derives from country censuses. In practice, 
however, it may refer to the percentage of the population of or above a certain age 
with less than two years of primary school enrolment, or may even be self-defined. A 
more accurate measure of educational attainment would be mean years of schooling, 
but sufficient data pre-1950 to permit a long-run study are simply not available. Shane 
                                                 
41
 The Geary-Khamis method was developed by Geary (1958), and further refined by 
Khamis (1972).  
42
 See Maddison (1995), p. 163, also Heston and Aten (2002). 
43
 For further details on the ECLAC PPP methodology, see Economic Commission for Latin 
America (1963). 
44
 The complete data set may be downloaded with accompanying sources and 
methodological notes (in Spanish and Portuguese as well as English) from 
http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/. 
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and Barbara Hunt also produced new and more reliable data for life expectancy for 
the Thorp volume, which we have since updated and show in Table A6. Life 
expectancy at birth is defined as the number of years a newborn infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth remained unchanged throughout 
her lifetime. 
 
Finally, Table A7 shows the available data on urbanisation rates and relative levels of 
literacy in urban and rural areas.  
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Table A1 GDP per capita in 1970 PPP$, 3-yr average 
1970PPP$ 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina 497 658 586 695 723 827 941 1,206 1,333 1,116 1,460 
Bolivia … … … … … 236 189 270 337 289 329 
Brazil 114 132 155 171 198 235 339 471 801 829 874 
Chile 284 344 318 502 484 577 679 862 958 1,096 1,602 
Colombia 138 153 201 291 354 421 487 604 816 914 984 
Costa Rica … … 370 554 524 370 469 655 887 860 998 
Dom. Rep. … … … … … 234 299 376 549 508 685 
Ecuador 68 97 138 163 169 244 290 358 522 513 507 
El 
Salvador 
… … 109 178 190 
273 329 407 426 367 475 
Guatemala … … 169 266 413 342 364 453 588 507 583 
Haiti … … … … … 118 128 122 159 126 91 
Honduras … … 145 265 195 227 250 285 316 317 317 
Mexico 240 289 330 311 352 507 628 877 1,138 1,125 1,284 
Nicaragua … … 115 200 186 219 288 428 299 181 186 
Panama … … … … … 462 570 890 1,053 981 1,255 
Paraguay … … … … 304 296 302 352 575 585 560 
Peru 127 149 177 241 269 331 420 526 622 462 560 
Uruguay 456 566 519 755 664 864 902 963 1,148 1,131 1,457 
Venezuela 94 104 128 364 418 695 961 1,198 1,230 1,024 1,015 
            
LA6 203 254 268 321 350 436 543 721 975 964 1,084 
LA13 
 
109 136 238 299 280 313 357 441 544 469 538 
            
US 1,478 1,712 1,886 2,142 2,481 3,284 3,826 5,125 6,295 7,398 8,867 
N. Europe 1,194 1,295 1,227 1,552 1,871 1,853 2,775 3,879 4,823 5,986 6,695 
S. Europe 646 782 848 979 1,015 1,047 1,698 2,944 3,945 4,904 5,694 
Asia 223 242 254 260 264 225 282 337 424 624 823 
Notes: Northern Europe refers to United Kingdom, Germany, and France.  Southern 
Europe refers to Italy and Spain. Asia refers to India, Indonesia, and Korea. 3-year 
averages except for 1900, 2000: 1900-2, 1998-2000, respectively; and 1920 for LA13: 
1920-2. GDP figures in constant local currency units rescaled to 1970 prices before 
conversion to purchasing power parity (PPP) prices using 1970 adjustment factors 
given in Table A3. LA13 for 1900, 1910: Ecuador, Peru only; 1920, 1930: Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua only; 1940: LA13 excluding 
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, and Peru. GDP in 1970 PPP prices for 
US calculated by applying index of GDP volume in constant PPP prices to US GDP 
in 1970; for Europe and Asia calculated by first applying the ratio of country GDP in 
1990 PPP prices and US GDP in 1990 PPP prices to US GDP in 1970 to derive GDP 
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in 1970 PPP prices for 1970, and then applying index of GDP volume in constant PPP 
prices. Data for Asia 1900-1910 excludes Korea. Sources: All population data for 
Latin America are from Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2003); data for US, Europe, 
and Asia are from Maddison (1995) for 1900-94; for US and Europe from IMF (2002) 
and for Asia from World Bank (2004) for 1995-2000. GDP in constant 1970 local 
currency units for Latin America are from Astorga, Bérges, and FitzGerald (2003); 
data for US GDP in constant PPP prices from Maddison (1995), for 1900-94 and IMF 
(2002), for 1995-2000, for Europe from Maddison (1995), for 1900-94 and IMF 
(2002) for 1995-2000; for Asia from Maddison (1995), for 1900-94, and World Bank 
(2004), with PPP conversion factors from World Bank (2004), for 1995-2000. Data 
on Cuban GDP are available as from 1985 only: see ECLAC (1999, 2001) and ONEC 
(2000). Between 1959 and 1984, official sources of Cuban economic performance 
report only Gross/Global Material Product (GMP) figures, in accordance with Cuba‘s 
use of the Soviet Material Product System (MPS). Estimating GDP from GMP figures 
is complicated by the fact that the latter excludes non-material services and takes a 
‗gross value‘ rather than a ‗value-added‘ approach; on this see Brundenius (1984), pp. 
19-40, Mesa-Lago (1981), pp. 39, 199-201, and Mesa-Lago (2000), pp. 564-5. 
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Table A2 GDP purchasing power parities and exchange rates 
(national currency units per dollar and ratio) 
 
Exchange 
rate 
Exchange 
rate 
ICP IVa ICP IVb AH ECLAC 
 1980 1970 1980 1980 1980 1970 
GDP purchasing power parities    
Argentina (pesos 
argentinos) 
1,837.16 3.79 2,709.0 2,604.0 2,596.0 2.95 
Brazil (new cruzeiros) 52.69 4.59 30.6 32.5 32.4 4.14 
Chile (new pesos) 39.00 0.01 28.8 26.7 26.5 0.01087 
Colombia (pesos) 47.28 18.44 23.1 22.0 21.6 10.68 
Mexico (silver pesos) 22.97 12.49 n.a. n.a. 13.4 8.88 
Venezuela (bolívares) 4.29 4.45 3.6 3.14 3.1 3.96 
   
PPP-exchange rate deviation indices   
Argentina   0.68 0.71 0.71 1.28 
Brazil   1.72 1.62 1.63 1.11 
Chile   1.35 1.46 1.47 1.04 
Colombia   2.05 2.15 2.19 1.73 
Mexico   … … 1.71 1.41 
Venezuela   1.19 1.37 1.38 1.12 
     
Sources and notes: There is some discrepancy between Hofman and Maddison ICP 
IV PPPs, so both are reported. AH and ICP IVa PPPs are from Hofman (2000), p. 
80; ICP IVb is from Maddison (1995), p. 177; ECLAC is from ECLAC (1978), p. 8. 
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Table A3 PPP adjustment of GDP per capita, 1970 
 GDP per capita in 1970 Conversion rates in 1970 
 
US$ 
(1) 
PPP$ 
(2) 
OER 
(3) 
PPPR 
(4) 
Argentina 940 1,208 3.79 2.95 
Bolivia 206 272 11.90 9.03 
Brazil 418 464 4.59 4.14 
Chile 819 850 11.28 10.87 
Colombia 351 606 18.44 10.68 
Costa Rica 506 659 6.63 5.09 
Dom. Rep. 326 375 1.00 0.87 
Ecuador 244 359 20.64 14.00 
El Salvador 276 406 2.50 1.70 
Guatemala 338 450 1.00 0.75 
Haiti 97 121 5.00 3.99 
Honduras 244 279 2.00 1.75 
Mexico 630 886 12.49 8.88 
Nicaragua 389 424 7.00 6.41 
Panama 673 885 1.00 0.76 
Paraguay 240 353 126.00 85.41 
Peru 420 529 38.70 30.72 
Uruguay 779 980 250.00 198.68 
Venezuela 1,078 1,212 4.45 3.96 
     
US 5,070 5,070 1.00 1.00 
     
Notes: col. 1, GDP per capita in US dollars at current prices in 1970; col. 2, GDP per 
capita in constant 1970 international PPP dollars in 1970; col. 3, Official nominal 
exchange rate in 1970, local currency units per US dollar; col. 4, PPP-adjusted 
exchange rate. Sources: col. 1 and col. 2, as for Table A2; col. 3, Latin America from 
Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2003); col. 4, ECLAC (1978), p. 8. 
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Table A4 Literacy rates 
Percent 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina 51 60 68 75 82 88 91 93 94 96 97 
Bolivia 19 20 23 25 28 32 44 58 69 78 86 
Brazil 35 35 35 40 44 49 60 68 76 81 85 
Chile 44 53 63 75 73 79 84 88 92 94 96 
Colombia 34 39 44 52 57 62 70 78 84 89 92 
Costa Rica 36 47 58 67 73 79 83 88 92 94 96 
Cuba 46 57 64 71 76 78 79 89 93 95 97 
Dom. Rep. … … 29 26 30 43 65 67 74 79 84 
Ecuador 33 38 42 46 51 56 66 74 82 87 92 
El 
Salvador 
26 27 27 28 35 42 48 58 66 73 79 
Guatemala 12 13 15 19 24 29 36 45 53 61 69 
Haiti 8 8 8 9 9 11 16 22 31 40 50 
Honduras 28 30 32 34 35 40 45 53 62 69 75 
Mexico 24 30 35 36 46 61 65 75 82 88 91 
Nicaragua … … 39 39 39 38 47 57 61 65 67 
Panama 17 27 42 46 59 67 73 79 85 89 92 
Paraguay 31 38 45 52 59 66 73 80 86 90 93 
Peru 24 29 33 37 42 51 60 72 80 86 90 
Uruguay 59 65 71 76 81 86 90 93 95 97 98 
Venezuela 28 29 32 36 42 51 62 77 84 89 93 
            
LA6 33 38 42 47 53 60 68 75 81 86 89 
LA13 25 28 32 35 40 46 55 64 71 77 82 
            
US 89 92 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 100 99 
Notes: Reported figures come from census data, interpolations between census years. 
LA13 for 1900, 1910 exclude Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Sources: All 
literacy figures for 1900-60 are from Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2003). See 
Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2003) for further discussion of primary sources and 
splicing methods. 
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Table A5 Life Expectancy at birth 
Years 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina 39 44 49 53 56 61 65 67 70 72 73 
Bolivia 26 28 31 33 36 40 43 46 52 58 62 
Brazil 29 31 32 34 37 43 55 59 63 66 68 
Chile 29 30 31 35 38 49 57 62 69 74 75 
Colombia 29 31 32 34 38 49 57 61 66 69 71 
Costa Rica 32 33 37 42 49 56 62 67 72 76 76 
Cuba 32 36 39 42 45 56 64 70 74 74 76 
Dom. Rep … … … 26 34 44 52 58 64 69 67 
Ecuador … … … … … 48 53 58 63 68 70 
El 
Salvador 
… … 28 29 36 44 50 57 57 66 70 
Guatemala 24 24 25 25 29 38 46 52 58 63 65 
Haiti … … … … … 36 42 47 52 56 53 
Honduras … … 29 34 36 39 46 53 60 67 66 
Mexico 25 28 34 34 39 48 57 61 67 71 73 
Nicaragua … … 24 28 34 39 47 54 59 64 68 
Panama … … … 36 42 50 61 65 70 72 74 
Paraguay 25 29 33 38 42 48 55 61 67 69 70 
Peru … … … … 37 40 48 54 60 66 69 
Uruguay 49 52 52 50 58 66 68 69 70 72 74 
Venezuela 28 29 31 32 38 51 60 65 68 71 73 
            
LA6 29 31 35 37 40 48 57 61 65 69 70 
LA13 31 33 33 34 38 43 50 55 60 66 67 
            
US 48 52 57 59 64 68 70 71 74 75 77 
Sources: Estimates of life expectancy reported in OxLAD were produced by Barbara 
and Shane Hunt with data from Arriaga (1968), Palloni (1990), and CELADE (1996). 
To complete the series for the aggregate of Latin America in 1945, Ecuador and Haiti 
figures in this year are obtained by subtracting one year from the figure of 1950. 
LA13 for 1900: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay only; 1920: 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay only; 1930: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, and Uruguay only; 1940: 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay only.  
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Table A6 Historical living standard index (HLSI) 
 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina 0.34 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.74 
Bolivia … … … … … 0.24 0.28 0.36 0.45 0.50 0.56 
Brazil 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.61 0.64 
Chile 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.75 
Colombia 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.69 
Costa Rica … … 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.69 0.72 0.73 
Cuba … … … … … … … … … … … 
Dom. Rep. … … … … … 0.30 0.43 0.48 0.56 0.60 0.62 
Ecuador … … … … … 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.64 
El 
Salvador … … 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.60 
Guatemala … … … 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.55 
Haiti … … … … … 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.31 
Honduras … … 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.52 0.54 
Mexico 0.13  0.17  0.23  0.23  0.30  0.42  0.50  0.57  0.64  0.68  0.71  
Nicaragua … … … 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.50 
Panama … … … … … 0.45 0.54 0.61 0.66 0.69 0.72 
Paraguay … … … … 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.53 0.62 0.65 0.66 
Peru … … … … … 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.59 0.64 
Uruguay … … … … 0.56 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.75 
Venezuela 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.42 0.52 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.70 
            
LA6 0.17  0.21  0.24  0.28  0.32  0.40  0.49  0.56  0.62  0.65  0.68  
LA13 … … … 0.18 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.52 0.56 0.59 
            
US 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.87 
Notes: LA13 for 1920, 1930: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua only. Sources: as for Tables A1, A4, and A5. 
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Table A7 Urbanisation in LA6 countries, and comparison of literacy in rural and 
urban areas, 1900-2000  
(percent) 
Urbanisation ratio Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
1900-10 29 10 20 6 6   
1911-20 30 10 23   7   17 
1921-30 38 15 38 15 15 24 
1931-40             
1941-50 62         28 
1951-60   36 61 43 43 48 
1961-70 76 51 72 54 55 67 
1971-80 81 62 79 61 63 76 
1981-90 85 71 83 67 70 82 
1991-2000 88 79 84 72 74 86 
              
Ratio of urban-rural 
literacy 
      
1900-10   187    
1911-20       
1921-30       
1931-40    185   
1941-50 119 222    252 
1951-60 115  137 157 154  
1961-70  172 126 145 138 212 
1971-80 112 155  136   
1981-90   120 121  142 
1991-2000 110  113   126 
 
Sources and notes: Urbanisation data for Argentina: Calculated from Laks (1971) p. 
23 and comprise populations of Buenos Aires, Rosario, Córdoba, Tucumán, La Plata, 
Santa Fé, Mendoza, Bahia Blanca, Paraná, Corrientes, and Salta, for 1916 and 1920 
except datum for 1909 estimated by applying ratio of population of Buenos Aires in 
1909 (reported in Scobie 1978 p. 427-9) and 1895 to other cities in 1895; Brazil: 
Calculated from Conniff et al (1971) p. 37, for Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Salvador, 
Recife, Belém, Pôrto Alegre, Niteroi, Curitiba, Manaus, Maceió, and Fortaleza for 
1900 and 1920; Chile: Calculated from Conniff (1971) p. 54, for Santiago, 
Valparaiso, Concepción, Antofagasto, Iquique, and Tolca for 1907, 1920; Colombia: 
Calculated from Friedel and Jimenez (1971) p. 62, for Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla, 
Cartagena, Cali, and Manizales for 1905 and 1912 ; Mexico: Calculated from Wibel 
and de la Cruz (1971) p. 95, for Mexico City, Guadalajara, Puebla, Monterrey, 
Mérida, San Luis Potosí, Vera Cruz, and Guanajuato for 1900, 1910, and 1921. Data 
for 1930 are calculated from Scobie (1986) p. 159. Data from 1940s onwards and for 
Venezuela from 1920 onwards are calculated from Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald 
(2003). Urban-rural literacy data are unpublished estimates provided by Shane and 
Barbara Hunt from the following country censuses: Argentina, 1947, 1960, 1980; 
Brazil, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980; Chile, 1952, 1960, 1970, 1982; Colombia, 1951, 
1964, 1973; Mexico, 1960, 1970; and Venezuela, 1950, 1961, 1971, 1981. 
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[Figures in Text] 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Trends in per capita income in Latin America over the twentieth century 
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Source: Table A1. 
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Figure 2 Literacy in Latin America 
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Source: Table A4. 
 
 
Figure 3 Life expectancy in Latin America 
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Source: Table A5. 
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Figure 4 Historical living standard index (HLSI) 
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Source: Table A6. 
 
Figure 5 Convergence in living standards within the LA6 
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Source: Table A6. 
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Figure 6a GDP per capita relative to the US 
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Source: Table A1. 
 
Figure 6b GDP per capita in the LA6, LA13 and the US 
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Note: LA6 and LA13 lie on the left-hand axis. US lies on the right-hand axis. Source: Table A1.  
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Figure 7 Life expectancy at birth relative to the US 
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
1
9
0
0
1
9
1
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
3
0
1
9
4
0
1
9
5
0
1
9
6
0
1
9
7
0
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
p
er
ce
n
t
LA6 
LA13
 
Source: Table A5. 
 
Figure 8 Historical Living Standards Index relative to the US 
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Source: Table A6. 
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Figure 9 Latin American GDP per capita relative to Northern and Southern 
Europe, Asia and the US 
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Note: Asia lies on the right hand axis, all others on left hand axis. Source: Table A1. 
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Figure 10 Openness and growth in the LA6 
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Sources and notes: ‗Trade openness‘ defined as the average of imports and exports divided by GDP 
(i.e. YMX 2/)(  ). Data on exports and imports from Astorga, Bergés and FitzGerald (2003); GDP 
per capita growth rates as for Table A1. 
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[Tables in Text] 
 
 
 
Table 1 Income per capita, literacy and life expectancy in Latin America 
 
GDP per capita 
(1970 PPP dollars) 
Literacy 
(percent) 
Life Expectancy 
(years) 
 1900 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 
          
Argentina 497  811  1,459  51  88  97  39  61  73  
Brazil 114  245  874  35  49  85  29  43  68  
Chile 284  592  1,602  44  79  96  29  49  75  
Colombia 290  389  921  34  62  92  29  49  71  
Mexico 240  519  1,284  24  61  91  25  48  73  
Venezuela 94  719  1,014  28  51  93  28  51  73  
          
LA6 216  440  1,077  33  60  89  29  48  70  
LA13 …  319  538  25  46  82  31  43  67  
Source: See Tables A1, A4 and A5. 
 
 
Table 2 Growth and instability of GDP per capita in Latin America 
 1900-39 1940-80 1981-2000 
 Growth S.Dev. Volat. Growth S.Dev. Volat. Growth S.Dev. Volat. 
          
Argentina 1.0 5.0 4.3 1.7 4.7 2.8 0.6 5.2 16.5 
Brazil 1.6 4.3 2.6 3.7 3.5 1.0 0.7 3.8 10.1 
Chile 1.4 11.2 5.6 1.7 4.3 2.3 2.6 5.2 1.9 
Colombia 0.3 3.0 7.9 2.1 2.2 1.0 0.7 4.2 5.8 
Mexico 1.0 5.2 4.7 3.2 2.9 1.0 0.6 4.0 4.5 
Venezuela 3.9 9.3 2.2 2.8 4.4 1.6 -0.9 5.0 5.5 
          
LA6 1.3 3.5 2.2 2.7
 
2.0 0.7 0.6 2.4 4.4 
LA13 - - - 2.1
 a
 1.4
a 
0.6
 a
 -0.1 2.7 51.8 
a
 1945-80. Source: Table A1. 
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Table 3 Mortality Rates in Latin America and US, 1960-2000  
    
 Latin America USA 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 2000 
Adult female (per 1,000 female adults) 233 189 154 130 125 
 
129 
 
84 
Adult male (per 1,000 male adults) 304 256 228 198 222 231 147 
Infant (per 1,000 live births) 102 86 61 43 31 26 7 
Under-5 (per 1,000) 154 123 82 53 36 30 9 
     
 
  
Source: World Bank (2004)  
 
 
 
Table 4 Urbanisation and urban-rural literacy rates in LA6, 1900-2000 
  
 Urbanisation ratio Ratio of urban-rural literacy 
   
1900-10 14 187 
1911-20 17  
1921-30 24  
1931-40  185 
1941-50 45 198 
1951-60 46 141 
1961-70 63 159 
1971-80 70 134 
1981-90 76 128 
1991-2000 81 116 
Source: Table A7. Note: these are simple averages in each decade for those countries for which there 
are data in Table A7, and are thus not entirely consistent. 
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Table 5 The Standard of Living in Latin America in 2000 compared to the USA in 
1900  
 LA6 in 2000 USA in 1900 
GDP per capita (1970 PPP $)  1078 1478 
Life expectancy (years) 70 48 
Literacy (percent) 89 89 
HSLI 0.68 0.57 
Source: Tables A1, A4, A5 and A6. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Per capita income, adult literacy and life expectancy relative to the US 
 GDP per capita  Literacy  Life expectancy 
 1900 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 1900 1950 2000 
          
Argentina 34 23 16 58 90 98 81 89 95 
Brazil 8 7 10 39 51 86 61 63 88 
Chile 19 17 18 49 81 97 60 71 98 
Colombia 20 11 10 38 63 93 60 71 93 
Mexico 16 15 14 27 62 92 52 70 94 
Venezuela 6 21 11 31 52 94 58 75 95 
          
LA6 15 13 12 38 62 90 60 70 92 
LA13 … 9 6 29 47 83 64 64 87 
Notes: as for Table 1. Sources: Tables A1, A4, A5. 
 
 
 
